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Consequences of Decentralization:
Environmental Impact Assessment and
Water Pollution Control in Indonesia
ADRIAAN BEDNER
After having been one of the most centralized states in the world for more than
thirty years, in 2001 Indonesia introduced a sweeping program of decentralization
with important consequences for the management of the industrial sector. This
article explores whether the decentralization process has led to substantial
changes in Environmental Impact Assessment (EIA) and enforcement of water
pollution law. Its main findings are that the general division of authority in both
fields has become less fragmented and that differences between districts have
increased, but, in practice, not so much has changed as one would have expected.
For EIA, “horizontal” disputes between sectoral agencies have been supplanted by
“vertical” disputes between different levels of government. Monitoring and sanc-
tioning of industrial water pollution have mainly continued within the scheme of
the provincial program started under Soeharto’s centralized regime, with still few
initiatives at the district level. If any, such initiatives are usually driven by public
complaints. On the other hand, there are indications that in the longer run the
institutional changes may have more significant effects on EIA and enforcement
practice. For EIA, these seem to be negative; for enforcement of water pollution
regulation this depends much on the situation within a district or a province.
INTRODUCTION
The way authority is divided across levels of government has a clear influence
on the performance of environmental control, meaning the processes of
standard setting, monitoring, and imposing sanctions in order to protect the
environment. The multifaceted nature of environmental damage and pollu-
tion, from a fully localized affair to something with impacts on a global scale,
makes it difficult to determine an “ideal” situation from a government per-
spective. Authority over environmental control, therefore, is a subject prone
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to contest between government levels. As externalities of economic activities
may be felt downstream a river, nationally, or “globally,” government actors
from the district level up to international forums hold an interest in environ-
mental control and may therefore compete for such authority.
These tensions have been well documented for developed countries. There
is a great deal of literature on how the federal scheme in the United States has
evolved in relation to the competences of the states, or how the European
Union has influenced systems of environmental control in its member states.
The same applies to Australia and Canada. Such studies demonstrate that,
indeed, it is not easy to strike an effective balance in dividing authorities
across levels of government. However, most will agree that after a good deal
of experimentation the majority of countries in the developed world eventu-
ally have found workable solutions (e.g., Doern 1993; Rechtschaffen and
Markell 2003; Breton et al. 2007).
A similarly extensive literature does not exist for developing countries.1
There is a large and still-expanding body of literature on decentralization and
development,2 and, likewise, many scholars have addressed the relation
between decentralization and natural resource management. Nevertheless,
few writings specifically address the relation between decentralization and
environmental control, in spite of the good reasons to pay attention to this
topic. Problems concerning environmental pollution and damage are perva-
sive in most developing countries, while pressure from international donors
has induced many highly centralized states to devolve authorities to lower
levels of government (Manor 1999).
This particularly applies to Indonesia, which under Soeharto’s New
Order counted among the most centralized countries in the world but has
changed radically since. One year after Soeharto stepped down, the country
adopted a new Act on Regional Autonomy (no. 22 of 1999, now replaced
by Act no. 32 of 2004), which introduced sweeping changes. Not only were
tasks devolved to the district level but the powers and funds required for
carrying them out were as well.3 International donors and other supporters
of decentralization suddenly found themselves in a state of alarm when they
considered the consequences this act was likely to have and put all their
efforts to channeling the process into a manageable form (Hofman and
Kaiser 2002).
A field of particular concern, and rightly so, was environmental manage-
ment. Until 2001, this had been an almost exclusively central government
affair, certainly on paper. Most environmental law and policies were made by
sectoral central government departments in Jakarta, notably those of indus-
tries, forestry, and mining. Policy directives and implementing decrees were
passed on to the branch offices of these departments (kantor wilayah), which
were to further implement and enforce them. Such branch offices were to be
found at both the provincial level and the district level (or municipality), with
most of the activities “on the ground” being performed by the branch offices
at the district level.
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The Department of the Environment attempted to coordinate the law- and
policy-making process at the central level and to set environmental stan-
dards, but it had little say over the sectoral ministries (Bedner 2003a; Otto
2003). It held no operational powers, and as a result could not implement
its own policies. To compensate for this lack of clout, the Minister of the
Environment has headed, since 1990, a special agency called the national
Environmental Impact Agency (Bapedal). Bapedal was supposed to coordi-
nate implementation and enforcement of environmental norms, but it lacked
effective power and capacity to do so. As a result, environmental regulation,
policies, implementation, and enforcement were both centralized and frag-
mented across several departments (Bedner 2003b).
The expectation was that this system would radically change with the
introduction of decentralization (Bedner 2000; Niessen and Van Lotringen
2000). The Regional Autonomy Act (no. 22 of 1999; RAA) greatly expanded
the scope of authorities at the district level, at the expense of the central and
the provincial governments’ authorities. The obvious consequence seemed
that monitoring and enforcement of environmental law would no longer be
performed by branch offices from sectoral central government departments
but would become the full responsibility of the districts. It seemed likely that
this would introduce major changes in the practice of environmental control.
The literature on decentralization and environmental management sug-
gests that the effects of such far-ranging decentralization may well have
detrimental effects on the environment. An often-cited danger is that local
political elites may use the newly acquired powers for their own benefit in
the absence of sufficient upward or downward accountability; that is, the
government apparatus may be “captured” by business interests (Dupar and
Badenoch 2002: 67–68). Other reasons include the difficulty of dealing with
pollution created in one (autonomous) district or province but causing effects
in another, and the environmental consequences of a “race to the bottom” for
investment (Revesz and Stavins 2004: 57–59). Likewise, district governments
may lack the will or even the capacity to carry out their environmental
responsibilities. Indeed, many environmentalists in Indonesia voiced such
concerns when the decentralization process started (Bedner 2000).
On the other hand, decentralization may very well be beneficial for envi-
ronmental management. It may make it easier for local constituencies to hold
district or provincial governments accountable for their performance and to
voice their concerns about environment issues, whether through parliamen-
tary control or “direct” actions. Another advantage can be that better knowl-
edge of the local situation enables the government to find “tailor-made”
solutions, instead of imposing centrally manufactured ones, while the gov-
ernment may actually even prioritize environmental protection. It should be
stated, however, that at the time of implementation of Indonesia’s RAA
nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) and academics promoting environ-
mental management were more concerned about its dangers than hopeful
about its benefits (Bedner 2000).
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The present article examines the Indonesian experience on the basis of
these theses. It will examine what has happened so far and whether the
changes have led to improvement or deterioration of two important issues
in environmental control: Environmental Impact Assessment (EIA) and
enforcement of water pollution regulation.4 The article first analyzes the
general division of authority in environmental management, presenting an
overview of the legal structure underpinning EIA and water pollution law
enforcement. After a brief description of the centralized system in place when
the Environmental Management Act (EMA) was enacted in 1997, it discusses
the legal consequences of the RAAs of 1999 and 2004 (Act no. 32) on this
framework. The article then looks at how the law at the provincial and
district levels has changed. Next, it turns to EIA and water pollution law
enforcement in practice. This overview is perforce exploratory in nature, as
no comprehensive materials are available. The account of Indonesia gener-
ally is drawn from an analysis of the scholarly and policy literature, while the
more extensive data on West Java, in particular the Bandung region, are
based on short periods of field work conducted in 2000, 2001, and 2003, and
more recent interviews with key informants to update the materials. Of much
importance have been the reports and publications on Indonesia’s environ-
mental programs (see below) and the environmental reports by the World
Bank. In spite of their limitations, the materials suffice to offer an adequate
overview, which may serve as a basis for more in-depth research.
EIA AND POLLUTION ENFORCEMENT IN THE EMA OF 1997
One of the New Order’s last major pieces of legislation was the EMA of 1997,
which replaced Indonesia’s first EMA of 1982. The act clearly took a cen-
tralist view on environmental management as its point of departure. It
intended to repair several flaws of its predecessor statute and introduced a
number of new environmental law tools developed since 1982, such as the
environmental audit and the class action.
An important concern of the drafters was to increase the influence of the
Minister of the Environment vis-à-vis his powerful colleagues in charge of
sectors such as forestry, mining, and industries. To this end, the EMA attrib-
uted some operational powers to the State Minister that enabled him to play
a more direct role in enforcement. Much hope was invested in the newly
acquired power of the StateMinister to appoint his own special investigators,
who could undertake investigation independently from the police as well as
from officials charged with supervision of firms in sectors such as mining,
forestry, and industries (Bedner 2003b).
In addition, the EMA brought several changes regarding enforcement
generally. Most conspicuous was a section on administrative enforcement,
which up until then had never been regulated in any act of a general nature.
The EMA also considerably expanded the opportunities for citizens to lodge
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complaints or to bring suit before a court in cases of suffering from environ-
mental pollution or damage, including suits brought by NGOs who were
unequivocally allowed to act on behalf of environmental interests (Art.
38(1)). Environmental criminal law enforcement was further invigorated,
with more punitive sanctions and a new section added on corporate crime
(Bedner 2003b)—the first one in Indonesian law. Regarding EIA, the EMA
brought nothing new when compared to the previous regulation. It stipulated
that every plan for an activity with potentially serious impact on the envi-
ronment needed an EIA and that without an EIA no permit could be
obtained (Arts. 15 and 18(1)). The subject was to be further regulated by a
government regulation.
Decentralization was not a major issue in the EMA. “Deconcentration”—
implementation of central laws and policies by the branch offices of the
central government—was to be the primary mechanism for environmental
management (Art. 12). The central government was allowed to delegate
certain tasks and authorities to lower levels of government, but it was cer-
tainly not stimulated to do so (Art. 13). Hence, enforcement remained, for
the most part, a central government affair: by far, most enforcement agents
were part of the central government structure of sectoral deconcentrated
branch offices or belonged to the police, which to this day is a centralized
organization.
Just on one point did the EMA introduce a decentralizing measure. It
attributed to the provincial governor the power to use administrative coer-
cion against someone causing environmental distress (Art. 25). This gave
rise to—probably unintended—overlapping competences in some cases. For
instance, if a chemical spill into a river were to occur, both the Department
of Industries and the governor of the province concerned could take action.
Alternatively, they could not take action and blame each other for inertia
(Bedner 2003b).
In practice, there were three exceptions to this general rule of central state
authority in enforcement, none of which found its basis in the EMA. First,
from 1989 onwards the provinces had been responsible for the Clean River
Program (Program Kali Bersih or Prokasih), which was intended to counter
river pollution by industries.5 Although guided by the central government’s
Environmental Impact Agency until approximately 2000, the provinces had
always held the authority for supervision and enforcement in the framework
of this program. This had been an obvious choice, given that the governors—
the heads of the provinces—issued the wastewater license to firms discharg-
ing wastewater into rivers. The authority to supervise the use of this license
was, at least in theory, the tool to enforce compliance with the Clean River
Program, and therefore primary responsibility for the program lay with the
provinces.
The second exception concerned the supervision by provinces and districts
of their respective land-use plans. If activities were conducted that violated
such plans, for instance illegal building, the authority whose land-use plan
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had been violated could act against the trespasser on the basis of the Spatial
Planning Act (no. 24 of 1992). A related issue was EIA, which for projects
below a certain size fell within the authority of the provinces (Arts. 1–8 of
Government Regulation (GR) no. 29 of 1986).
Finally, the district head issued and was authorized to enforce the so-called
nuisance license, which still dated from colonial times and was—albeit a very
general one—the only tool for managing industrial pollution and damage of
the environment at this level.
This legal framework was affected in several ways by the decentralization
project embodied in the RAA.
THE RAA’S IMPACT ON THE EMA’S DIVISION OF POWERS
In 1999, all of those concerned with environmental law and management
must have experienced a shock upon discovering that the newly promulgated
RAA almost completely excluded environmental management from the
central government’s authority. The RAA limited the role of the central
government to foreign and monetary affairs, defense and security, justice
administration, religion, national planning, strategic national resource
exploitation, conservation, and standard-setting (Art. 7). As a logical conse-
quence, environmental management was henceforth a district government
affair, with only residual roles for the provinces and the central government.
However, the RAA’s central implementing regulation, GR no. 25 of 2000,
soon made clear that the central government interpreted its own authorities
quite broadly. This raised immediate suspicions that the government
intended to return to its former dominant position. As a senior member of
the Provincial Environmental Impact Agency (Bapedalda or BPLHD)6 of
Jakarta Special Province commented at the time,
Did you already see GR no. 25 of 2000? There is no decentralization at all!
Look, in the RAA only five fields are held by the central government. And
here . . . . ! [. . .] And look here for instance, in the field of exploration the
central government determines the policy, and in a Ministerial Decree or some-
thing they’ll just determine that licensing still falls under the central govern-
ment. That is my prediction.7
This prediction turned out to be largely correct. The crucial sectors of
forestry, mining, and law enforcement have all but remained within the
powers of the central government. The same applies to the National Land
Agency (Badan Pertanahan Nasional), which plays an important role in
spatial planning through the land rights it issues (Warlan 2003) and which
has continued to remain a central government branch office.
There are two significant exceptions, however. First, the EIA system was
decentralized. GR no. 25 of 2000 gives the power to conduct an EIA to the
district where the activity is to take place—unless it potentially affects a large
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number of people or crosses district borders (Art. 2(3) under 18.c). Secondly,
licensing powers in the field of industries were effectively transferred from
the central government’s Minister of Industries to the district head, and this
removed industrial pollution control entirely from the purview of the central
government. Industrial pollution control became a shared task of the district
and the province: the district head administers the business permit and the
nuisance license, while the province is in charge of the wastewater license (as
it had always been). With the authority to provide the business permit came
the corollary powers of supervision and enforcement.
This is not to say that in practice the central government lost all its
involvement in environmental control of industries. Under the EMA of 1997
the Minister of the Environment holds the authority to “supervise the com-
pliance of those responsible for business and/or other activities with the
provisions of environmental legislation” (Art. 22(1)). Whether this provision
still applies under the new RAA scheme is questionable from a legal point of
view, but the minister has not changed his environmental policies. The reason
that district governments have not felt the need to raise their defenses against
this interpretation is probably that the Environmental Impact Agency,
charged with this article’s implementation, has never actually used its legal
powers.8 It has been important in getting parties to environmental conflicts
around the table and has exercised influence over local governments in this
matter (Nicholson in press; Bedner 2007), but only in an informal way.9 As a
result, the provision still stands.
In summary, decentralization has not brought the important changes in
legal authority regarding environmental matters one would expect upon
reading the RAA. Environmental management is still overwhelmingly in the
hands of the central government, with control of EIA and industrial pollu-
tion the notable exceptions. In these areas, authority has been shifted down-
wards to the provinces and the districts, thereby creating a new system for
industries to deal with. Hence, these areas are well-suited to explore the
question whether decentralization has led to changes in environmental
control.
DECENTRALIZATION’S IMPACT ON EIA
The first step in the process ultimately leading to enforcement of industrial
pollution regulation is EIA, which provides the basis for monitoring and
enforcement. Each EIA contains the environmental management plan, which
subsequently becomes part of the business permit and is binding upon the
firm carrying out the activities allowed by this permit. It thus constitutes the
point of departure for supervision and enforcement, and, to a large extent, it
determines what can be enforced and how enforcement will be structured.
Until 2000 the EIA system was heavily centralized. The authority to
conduct EIAs on projects confined within district boundaries was attributed
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to the province, while projects stretching across them fell within the purview
of the central government. The system remained in place after a new govern-
ment regulation on EIA was enacted in 1999 (no. 27).10 This is rather pecu-
liar, given that this regulation was drafted parallel to the RAA. It may be
attributed to the general uncertainty about the direction decentralization
would take and the fact that the drafters departed from the situation as it was
under the EMA. A more practical reason may have been that the drafters
assumed most districts had insufficient capacity for evaluating EIAs at
that time.
As stated above, this system was discontinued by the RAA’s implementing
regulation GR no. 25 of 2000. This at first generated a practical problem,
because there were no legal rules on either EIA committees or procedures at
the district level. As a solution to fill this legal and institutional vacuum,11 the
EIA committees at the provincial level have continued to evaluate the EIAs
as they did before.12 Although one author argues that under the New Order
“the characteristics of effective EIA programs were largely absent and EIA
had not been implemented particularly effectively” (Boyle 1998: 113),
another points out that in Indonesia EIA had gradually improved to become
a useful instrument for environmental management (Purnama 2003). Merely
disposing of the provincial role in performing EIA would not necessarily
mean an improvement.
An increasing number of districts have by now established their own EIA
committees, however. This means that in those cases the province is no longer
involved in EIA evaluation, which may potentially lead to serious disputes.
That this danger is not unwarranted will be demonstrated below, in a dis-
cussion of the North Jakarta Coast Reclamation Project.
Decentralization has also caused one other fundamental change in EIA
procedures: following the implementation of the RAA in 2000, some districts
adjusted the rules for the size and scope of projects in need of an EIA. As a
result, fewer projects than before have to submit to the procedure. As a
manager of a developing firm active in Bogor district told me,
We applied for an EIA for a new developing project, but we were told by the
district government that we no longer needed to do so, as Bogor had changed
its regulations and such smaller real estate projects as this one no longer needed
an EIA—at least not in Bogor district.13
The vice head of the EIA Department of the Environmental Impact Agency
of West Java province confirmed that this was the case for several districts
within his province.14 In response to this situation, the Minister of the Envi-
ronment issued a new list of activities in need of an EIA in 2001. This action
was not entirely successful, however, for some of the districts concerned
denied that they were bound by this decree, which they considered of lower
status than their own district regulations.15 In West Java, at least, the situa-
tion has therefore remained unchanged in this respect.16
Bedner CONSEQUENCES OF DECENTRALIZATION 45
© 2009 The Author
Journal compilation © 2009 Baldy Center for Law and Social Policy
Similar problems have emerged between the central and the provincial
level, on account of a discrepancy between the GR no. 25 of 2000 (imple-
menting the RAA) and GR no. 27 of 1999 (on EIA). They have come to the
fore in a rather dramatic way in the widely publicized North Jakarta Coast
Reclamation Project and led to a widely publicized conflict between Gover-
nor Sutiyoso of Jakarta Province and State Minister of the Environment
Nabiel Makarim.
The conflict concerned the EIA for a huge project to expand Jakarta’s
north coast across fifteen miles, adding 2,700 hectares of new land to the
city.17 The project initially came to a halt during the economic crisis but was
given new life by Jakarta’s Governor Sutiyoso, who claimed that the city
needed the reclamation to accommodate its increasing population. Environ-
mental groups have vehemently opposed the plan, as they think it will nega-
tively impact the marine environment, cause severe flooding during the
rainy season in what is now North Jakarta, and be detrimental to the live-
lihood of thousands of fishermen. In February 2003, the controversy grew
into a real conflict, after State Minister of the Environment Nabiel
Makarim rejected the project’s EIA in his capacity as head of the national
EIA committee. At the basis of this committee’s jurisdiction is the fact that
the reclamation stretches beyond Jakarta province into the provinces of
Banten and West Java. Sutiyoso, who already held an approved EIA from
Jakarta province,18—one he had approved himself, that is—retorted that he
did not care what the state minister thought about the EIA, as these were
the days of regional autonomy. When shortly thereafter he backed down,
apparently deciding that he should avoid a head-on confrontation, it
seemed that the matter had been settled in favor of the central EIA
committee.
This turned out to be incorrect, however. At Sutiyoso’s initiative, the six
firms involved in the project took the state minister to the administrative
court, which then passed a legally incomprehensible judgment. In the first
place, the judges assumed jurisdiction over an administrative decision that
is neither general nor final, two demands set by the Administrative Court
Act (no. 5 of 1986, Art. 47).19 Secondly, the decision by the committee was
annulled because the project found its legal basis in a presidential decree, and
the Minister of Environment would not be allowed to go against the wishes
of the president.20 The consequence of this line of thinking would be that
presidential projects supersede acts of parliament, as the EIA finds its basis in
the EMA of 1997. Fortunately, the administrative high court overturned this
decision and the case has been submitted to the Supreme Court for review
(Wulandari 2008).
It seems that apart from these jurisdictional problems, the practice of EIA
has not changed much. In a recent study the World Bank (2005) noted that
due to the variation in capacity between provinces and districts the imple-
mentation of EIA “is likely to remain patchy for the foreseeable future”
(ibid.: 9). The same report notes that one of the key challenges is “to reform
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the existing mechanisms for public involvement in order to encourage greater
public engagement” (ibid.: 10).
To this end, the Bank supports a program called Revitalizing EIA, which
builds on the experience that the South Sulawesi Environmental Impact
Agency could exploit the fear for public unrest to make sure that public
consultation occurred during the EIA procedure for a new power plant in
Bangkala (World Bank 2005). Meetings were widely announced and infor-
mation was spread among the potentially affected communities in advance.
A project that paid similar attention to this issue concerned a chemical
plant in Jakarta. A striking remark by the report related to this project is
the observation that the Jakarta Environmental Impact Agency attached
particular value to the public consultation because it recognized its own lack
of capacity to carry out adequate monitoring, a remark that underlined
the particular importance of the link between public involvement and
enforcement.
A few other findings fall into the same category. The first is that while the
majority of districts have adopted the national guidelines on EIA procedures
some have adjusted them procedurally to the district or provincial regula-
tions already in place. This was in fact already possible under the former,
centralized regime, but it is likely that the increase in regional autonomy has
supported this development. The report also cites Jakarta and Surabaya as
examples of regions where due to water management problems certain
projects that normally would have been exempted from this procedure now
require an EIA (ibid).
The second finding concerns the Jakartan innovation to impose a duty to
self-monitor in the environmental plan. This reduces the monitoring burden
of the Jakarta Environmental Impact Agency, which can now limit itself to
checking whether the self-reporting has been adequate. Such a measure
would have had little effect in the previous situation, as a provincial govern-
ment such as Jakarta’s would have lacked the authority to integrate this
device with the monitoring practice of the Department of Industries. Given
the capacity problems mentioned before this seems helpful indeed (ibid.). A
similar policy is now followed in Yogyakarta province (ibid.).21 However,
whereas the Jakarta Environmental Impact Agency tends to take a more
“conciliatory” approach, its Yogyakarta counterpart relies more on admin-
istrative sanctions. To what extent this leads to different outcomes is as yet
unclear.
In summary, we may conclude that so far the decentralization process has
not led to clearly identifiable changes in the implementation of the EIA
regime. The North Jakarta Coast Reclamation Project case, however, points
to a potential danger in the new EIA regime: if a project is located within a
single district and that district has its own EIA committee, this body may be
confronted with serious political pressure to lower its standards in deciding
on certain projects. Collusion and corruption are also more likely to take
place if the EIA committee finds itself at this level. This depends, of course,
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on the political situation within a district, but studies of the effects of decen-
tralization in Indonesia are unanimous in their finding that in most districts
regional autonomy has led to an increase in corruption at the district level.
Likewise, clear cases of “capture” of the district government by local business
elites have been recorded. The chances for public involvement and pressure
to offset this, as suggested by the World Bank, seem slim at best. Combined
with the expanding list of district EIA committees on the website of the
Ministry of the Environment,22 the situation may therefore be changing for
the worse. Indeed, in 2006 the Department of the Environment carried out a
study into the practices of district EIA committees, finding that three quar-
ters of the approximately sixty functioning district EIA committees were
issuing documents of “poor” or “extremely poor” quality. The Minister of
the Environment said that “the authority to assess EIAs is [ . . . ] considered
a chance to earn extra income.”23
Another reason why it might have been wise to leave the responsibility for
EIA at the provincial level rather than give it to the districts is that they lack
sufficient capacity. Up until the present, however, there are no indications
that this has had serious consequences, as in several reported cases districts
have invoked provincial expertise in EIA procedures (ibid.). This argument is
therefore less compelling.
DECENTRALIZATION’S IMPACT ON WATER POLLUTION CONTROL24
The fact that under the predecentralization regime the central government’s
Department of Industries carried the primary responsibility for enforcing
pollution control on the basis of the business permit does not mean that
provincial and district agencies were not involved. From the mid-1980s
onwards, several actors at these levels used the limited authority they had to
try to enforce water pollution regulations in order to respond to social
outcry. In this era, regular monitoring and enforcement by the Department
of Industries functioned so poorly that factories often ignored or were not
even aware of environmental regulation (Afsah, Laplante, and Makarim
1996; Braadbaart 1995).25
Among the first provincial and district responses to the growing problems
of pollution were antipollution teams. West Java established such a team in
1980 after angry peasants burned down a factory after it had spilled caustic
soda (Braadbaart 1995). This Regional Coordination Team for Anti Pollu-
tion Action (TKP2D) operated under the deconcentrated branch office of the
National Investment Planning Board but could act quite independently.
Initially, it only took action after complaints had been made or after a
pollution incident, but after 1989 it started a regular monitoring program.
After having been quite successful for some years (ibid.), the antipollution
team’s budget was shifted to the Clean River Program team, which became
increasingly prominent as part of a national policy (see below). Another
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reason for disbanding the antipollution team was that the police and the
public prosecutor’s office—which were also involved in them—withdrew
their support.26
More successful in the longer run has been the already-mentioned Clean
River Program. The idea for the Clean River Program was first developed
by the provincial government in East Java before it was adopted by the
central government. With strong support from the East Java vice governor,
the program led to a significant reduction in wastewater discharges by fac-
tories (Lucas and Djati 2000). Key to the implementation of the program
was the governor’s authority to monitor the wastewater license. At first,
inclusion in the Clean River Program was voluntary, and this ensured the
cooperation of the firms involved with regard to monitoring. However,
gradually the program has changed to a more mandatory format and pro-
vided the provinces an increasingly serious role in monitoring and enforce-
ment. It should be noted, though, that monitoring of effluent was much
more difficult for the provincial authorities than for the Department of
Industries, as the latter did have access to the factories, whereas the former
could only monitor their performance by taking samples of river water
(Rock and Aden 1999).
The Clean River Program seems to have had a significant impact on the
reduction of water pollution, even if we take into account that the program
has allegedly suffered from underreporting by participating industries and
that some observers have raised doubts about the reliability of the data
reported (Bräuer 2003; Afsah, Laplante, and Makarim 1996). Since 1989,
provinces have produced reports on the Clean River Program, reports that
contain a wealth of information on pollution of waterways.27 The main
conclusions that can be drawn from them are the following.
First, if we look at the outcomes of the Clean River Program from 1989
through 1997, the number of industries that invested in pollution abatement
equipment consistently increased. That many of them also used this equip-
ment28 is witnessed by the increasing number of industries in compliance with
official effluent standards. A good indication is offered by the data of the
company’s Performance Ranking Evaluation Program (PROPER), a public
disclosure system of environmental data from the Clean River Program,
which started to run in 1995. The evaluation program’s data show that the
number of firms included in the Clean River Program whose discharges were
in compliance with environmental standards increased from 36 percent in
1995 to 55 percent in 1997 (Makarim 2006). The only in-depth study of the
Clean River Program by Lucas and Djati (2000), in the province of East Java,
confirms this outcome. The reports make clear that this was not due to a
lowering of standards, and there are no indications that other factors have
caused this change.
Second, and important in the context of decentralization, there was a
serious disparity in results between provinces. While in some provinces the
Clean River Program managed to reduce pollution substantially, notably in
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East and Central Java, in others, such asWest Java, the Clean River Program
was far less successful in the long run.29 The reports give no explanation
regarding the reasons for success, but a closer analysis indicates that the
intensity of monitoring river quality by the government in combination with
the willingness of the provincial government to impose sanctions corresponds
to success or failure.30
During this period, Java as a whole did better than Sumatra and the
other outer regions. According to Afsah, Garcia, and Sterner (2004), the
reasons are likely to be more community presence and more government
involvement. This already foreshadows one of the obvious consequences of
decentralization, which has been an increasing diversity in environmental
performance from one province or district to the other.
An important point to acknowledge is that a substantial number of firms
discharging wastewater into rivers do not participate in the Clean River
Program. This applies in the first place to the large number of small firms and
“home industries,” which are generally excluded altogether from environ-
mental monitoring (Braadbaart 1995: 441). Although they need to dispose of
a wastewater license, little effort has been made to achieve any monitoring
over such industries, which are basically considered “too small fish” to
bother, or too difficult to address.31 No matter how small, they do account
for a substantial amount of all pollution in industrialized parts of Indonesia,
so an investment in bringing these home industries in line would be most
fruitful from an environmental perspective.
To what extent, now, has decentralization changed the practice of water
pollution enforcement? At first glance the answer seems to be not much. As
my respondents at the central, provincial, and district levels emphasized, the
Clean River Program and its evaluation program have continued to be the
spearheads of pollution control efforts.32 The continuing importance of these
programs shows that regular enforcement of water pollution regulation on
the basis of business permits has not yet gotten off the ground.
In terms of administrative organization, however, the implementation of
the Clean River Program has been reinforced by decentralization. Since the
districts have acquired the monitoring powers of the Department of Indus-
tries, their enforcement agents now have access to factories, rendering their
tasks much easier than under the old regime. Moreover, environmental plant
monitoring is performed or led by the district environmental impact agencies,
instead of by the branch offices from the Industries Department.33 The dis-
trict agencies bring in environmental knowledge and focus that were lacking
when the latter was still in charge.34
Why this shift occurred is not quite clear. According to an official from the
West Java Environmental Impact Agency, the reason was that districts
received more funding from the central government if they had more depart-
ments. An environmental impact agency would therefore bring in money,
and if you have one, why not let it do something?35 If this is true, it is certain
that there was no environmental incentive behind this development.
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That monitoring and enforcement are important for the success of the
Clean River Program not only follows from the record of West Java in this
respect, as mentioned above, but was also emphasized by a study by Rock
and Aden (1999) on the performance and outcomes of this program in
Semarang. These authors noted a strong correlation between enforcement
actions and investment in pollution abatement equipment. The heads of the
environmental impact agencies in Bandung municipality and Bandung dis-
trict confirmed that monitoring and enforcement in the framework of the
Clean River Program had become easier after the changes brought by decen-
tralization.36 That this organizational improvement has significantly paid off
in practice is not clear, however. Data from the evaluation program indicate
that after very bad compliance rates following the economic crisis of 1997–
98, when the number of firms in compliance dropped from 55 percent to 35
percent, there has been significant improvement again. The latest figure
available is from 2005, which shows that with 52.5 percent of firms in com-
pliance, the rate has almost risen to the precrisis figure (Makarim 2006) but
still has not matched it.
Another issue is that within a single province, the Clean River Program
runs better in some districts than in others, because not all of them are
equally prepared to cooperate. A case in point in West Java is that of
Rancaekek. This area lies on the border between the districts of Sumedang
and Bandung, with the main textile factories (PT Kahateks and PT Sandang
Internusa) located in Sumedang. These discharge their wastewater into the
Citarum River, which flows from Sumedang to Bandung, causing loss of
harvest to the farmers in the latter district. After protests of farmers to the
subdistrict and district government of Bandung, the latter requested assis-
tance from the Sumedang district government in monitoring these firms.
Although all of the factories involved were included in the Clean River
Program, the Sumedang district government refused. It required the good
offices of the West Java Environmental Impact Agency to convince Sumed-
ang to allow Bandung inspectors to visit the factories concerned, but the
reluctance of Sumedang to cooperate in this matter has remained.37 This is
not surprising, as for Sumedang it would mean serious loss of income if these
firms were to move their premises elsewhere. This indicates that decentrali-
zation indeed increases the danger of “capture,” as already indicated in the
section about EIA or the difficulty in dealing with pollution created in one
district but causing effects in the other—two theses set out earlier.
Another issue one might be inclined to link to decentralization is that
recent figures (2004–2005) indicate Java has started to lag behind Sumatra
and the outer provinces in the Clean River Program as regards compliance
rates.38 This cannot be reduced to a better coverage of Java by the program,
with higher relative numbers also potentially including more environmental
laggards, because Sumatra is almost as well represented as Java with 28
percent of the total number of factories included in the program (Makarim
2006). An explanation more likely than decentralization, however, is the
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nature of the factories on Java. With a relatively high number of textile firms
and other manufacturing industries, Java has suffered more from the eco-
nomic crisis and increased competition than Sumatra and outer island prov-
inces, whose industry is oriented towards less value-added products such as
pulp and plywood (UNIDO 2001). This is an issue that needs further inves-
tigation, however.
In summary, it seems that although decentralization has boosted the
powers of the district for environmental control, these powers are underused.
When asked about this issue, interviewees at the national, district, and pro-
vincial environmental impact agencies confirmed this impression.39 Compli-
ance figures of the program have not changed significantly, and various cases
indicate that the potentially negative consequences of decentralization in this
realm—capture and problems with “transboundary” pollution—have indeed
materialized. However, just as in the case of EIA, some changes that are now
just visible are likely to become more pronounced in the longer term, but in
this case not all of them are negative.
The case of Rancaekek has already indicated that what may actually lead
the district or provincial government to action is public pressure. While
studies conducted in western settings indicate that such pressure may be an
independent force affecting environmental performance by polluting plants
(Kagan, Gunningham, and Thornton 2003), Nicholson (in press) has shown
how in Indonesia such pressure only seems to work if protesters succeed in
getting the government involved somehow.40 It seems that there are two sides
to this issue. First, firms may be either arrogant or convinced of their capacity
to keep protesters at bay, but they are more concerned about their relations
with the government. The other is that in the Indonesian legal system cir-
cumstantial evidence of pollution is not much valued, and the only way for
protesters to mount material against the firm accused of polluting is to get
such data from the government (Bedner 2007).
Despite the fact that decentralization is supposed to make it easier and
more effective for citizens to complain to the district government, the central
government has also continued to play a role in citizens’ actions against
pollution. The national Environmental Impact Agency has continued to
receive reports of environmental offenses, and its staff also actively compiles
files on certain cases.41 Such reports may come from all kinds of sources:
direct complaints from people afflicted by environmental pollution or
damage, information from newspapers, and cases brought to its attention by
NGOs, among others. If deemed necessary, cases are further investigated,
usually together with the provincial or district environmental impact agen-
cies.42 This role should not be underestimated, as the national Environmental
Impact Agency examines hundreds of cases every year. However, for impos-
ing administrative sanctions, this agency is completely dependent on the
provincial governor or the district head.
For that matter, public appeals to the district government were also made
under the centralized scheme of the New Order. However, district govern-
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ments sometimes invoked their lack of powers in monitoring and enforce-
ment to justify their nonintervention. A positive effect of decentralization is
that this route of escape has been cut off. An example is a case in Bekasi,
where after prolonged protests from local communities the district govern-
ment asked the Minister of the Environment to take action against two firms
causing pollution because, due to limited storage capacity, their wastewater
overflowed the neighborhood. While the state minister did warn the firms
concerned, he returned the case to the Bekasi district government as it was
beyond his power to impose any sanctions. Only then did the Bekasi govern-
ment issue a prohibition for the firms concerned to operate as long as they did
not improve their performance.43 This interplay between various levels of
government seems also an important issue to further explore.
While observers of Indonesian local politics are wary about the actual
functioning of democracy at the local level (e.g., Schulte Nordholt and Van
Klinken 2007), there is some support for the thesis that district governments
have to take local protests more seriously than they did under the New Order
(Reerink forthcoming).44 As Nicholson has indicated, this has had positive
effects on environmental dispute resolution from an environmental perspec-
tive (Nicholson in press). Again, it shows decentralization’s tendency to
promote diversity among districts (The Asia Foundation 2003).
This overview indicates that so far decentralization has only caused some
potentially significant changes regarding the practice of water pollution
control but not an overhaul. The practices existing before the implementa-
tion of the RAA have continued, with the provinces still in the driver’s seat
as the center of the Clean River Program efforts and with the provincial
governor as the provider of the wastewater license. The major shifts recorded
in performance seem to bear little relation to decentralization.
CONCLUSION
The effects of decentralization on the legislation and institutional framework
concerning EIA and water pollution have been significant. Nonetheless, the
EMA has turned out to be quite compatible with the RAA, in spite of its
having been drafted for a centralized system of environmental management.
A new EMA is currently being drafted and will be better adjusted to the new
system,45 but this is not to repair any major flaws resulting from the mis-
matches between the current EMA and the RAA. That authority in EIA
has been devolved from the provincial to the district level has not created
legal problems and neither has the transfer of water pollution enforcement
authority from the central to the district government. Indeed, some of the
EMA’s problems in divisions of authority have even been solved inadvert-
ently by the RAA and will hopefully be preserved under the new law.
The effects of these changes on practice, however, are not as clear as
one might expect. In both cases, there are indications that EIA and water
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pollution enforcement processes and their outcomes have become more
diverse between provinces and districts. This was to be expected, of course,
but the process of differentiation has not evolved equally as quickly, and in
both cases it has been the role of the province that has been central in
maintaining this balance.
As regards EIA, the reason seems to be mainly that district governments
have appeared not very eager to take away EIA from the provinces and have
continued to rely upon provincial expertise in this matter. This is somewhat
surprising, as EIA procedures are both a potential cash cow and a lynchpin
in attracting investment, and therefore an attractive target for a takeover.
However, districts have been slowly but steadily setting up their own EIA
committees, which may well lead to more jurisdictional disputes between
provinces and districts regarding EIA, similar to those that have already
occurred between the central government and the provinces. In addition, the
district EIA committees seem more prone to capture by local business elites.
The lack of change in water pollution enforcement also follows from the
role played by the provinces. First, these have continued to be the primary
actor in the Clean River Program, which to this day is still by far the
most important vehicle for water pollution control. District governments
have acquired new powers of monitoring and sanctioning, which formerly
belonged to the central government, and most of them now dispose of
environmental impact agencies—special environmental agencies—to imple-
ment these powers. However, they have not been very eager to use them for
environmental purposes. Again, monetary reasons may explain this, as these
powers are not the ones that bring in the goose that lays the golden eggs.
Second, the provinces have continued to administer and enforce the waste-
water license and can therefore act independently from the district govern-
ment. Given their position in administering disputes between districts, it is
quite important that they have kept this power.
What seems to have changed is that district and provincial governments
have become somewhat more responsive to complaints about water pollu-
tion, a tendency recorded for other issues as well. In this context, special
reference ought to be made to the opportunities for civil action in the courts.
Some of the 1997 EMA’s most radical changes were in opening up new
legal avenues for citizens suffering from environmental pollution or damage,
including a class action and mechanism for environmental mediation
(Nicholson 2003). In practice, these have only started to blossom after the
decentralization process got underway (Nicholson in press; Bedner 2007).
The decentralization dynamics have also provided a new impetus to
environmental law development, such as the suggestion of the Provincial
Parliament of North Sumatra to make the provincial Environmental
Impact Agency an independent body with the power to take polluters to court
without involving the police or the public prosecutor,46 the emergence of
public-private monitoring of potentially polluting firms,47 and the establish-
ment of intergovernment—civil society forums, for instance—for integrated
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river basin management (Asia Foundation 2003). So far, such issues seem to
have been of a rather incidental nature only. The Clean River Program also
started as such an incident, however, which gives some hope for the future.
Reconsidering the theses from the decentralization literature set out at the
start of this article, we must conclude that some of them have indeed mate-
rialized. On the positive side, the district and provincial government have
become more responsive in some cases, but through direct citizens’ action or
legal action rather than through parliamentary accountability. The thesis
about “tailor-made” solutions cannot be checked by absence of relevant
data, so that remains a point for new research.
As regards the “negative” theses, four of them—unaccountability and/or
capture, problems of transboundary pollution, not making the environment
a priority, or not having the capacity to effectively carry out environmental
tasks—have indeed materialized to a variable degree. A race to the bottom
could not, however, be noted.
Generally speaking, there are serious environmental problems in the
current situation, which may perhaps not be caused by but certainly are
linked to decentralization. Water pollution levels continue to be high and few
EIAs are up to the standard. More in-depth studies of environmental law
practices at the district level are badly needed, in particular to evaluate what
will happen in the long run. As noted above, economic concerns seem to
be tilted clearly against the chances for effective water pollution control, and
this may be reinforced by regional autonomy. Likewise, the shift in EIA
authority for many projects from the provincial to the district level carries
serious dangers. It is important to evaluate the results of decentralization in
the long run in order to define adequate responses.
adriaan bedner is Senior Lecturer, Van Vollenhoven Institute for Law, Governance
and Development, Faculty of Law, Leiden University.
NOTES
1. Breton et al. (2007) also contains a few chapters on developing countries.
2. For an overview, see Bardhan (2002).
3. The degree of fiscal autonomy is limited, however, as most funds are still admin-
istered by the central government. Still, districts have tried hard to raise their
income on the basis of the limited fiscal autonomy they do have (e.g., Schulte
Nordholt and Van Klinken 2007).
4. Enforcement in this article refers to both monitoring and imposing sanctions.
5. For a general description of the Prokasih program, see Afsah, Laplante and
Makarim (1996). Amore comprehensive account can be found in Lucas andDjati
(2000). Initially, Prokasihmainly concerned a transfer of funds from the center to
the provinces in order to stimulate the provincial government to manage and
supervise its wastewater licenses in a proper manner. Subsequently, the provinces
have had to perform these activities from their own budgets.
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6. Bapedalda stands for Badan Pengendalian Dampak Lingkungan Daerah (Regional
Agency for Environmental Control). The name is used for both provincial and
district environmental agencies. In some districts and provinces it is called
BPLHD (Badan Pengelolaan Lingkungan Hidup Daerah or Regional Environ-
mental Management Agency). For reasons of convenience I will further refer to
Provincial or District Environmental Impact Agency.
7. Interview (May 2000).
8. The Environmental Impact Agency has a special Compliance and Enforcement
Unit for this task.
9. Many had in fact expected that Article 22(1) of the EMA would render Bapedal
truly operational by allowing the State Minister of the Environment to send his
own special investigators around in U.S. Environmental Protection Agency
(EPA)-style. This has not happened, however (Bedner 2003a).
10. The details on the EIA committees at the central and the provincial level are
provided by GR no. 27 of 1999. A major change is that the EIA committees are
no longer headed by an official from the sectoral department concerned, but
rather by an official of the environmental agency (see also Bedner 2008).
11. As acknowledged by the StateMinistry, which has listed GR no. 27 of 1999 as one
of the regulations that needs to be adjusted to the RAA (Rapat Kerja Prokasih,
November 2000. Available at http://www.menlh.go.id/airnet/ProsedNov2000_
02A.htm (accessed 15 August 2003)).
12. On the basis of transitional Article 9 of GR no. 25 of 2000. Interview with the
Vice Head of the EIA-department of the BPLHD West Java, Mr. Wisandana
(July 2001).
13. Interview with Mr. Martin (July 2001).
14. Interview (July 2001).
15. Ibid. The issue of legal hierarchy has always given problems in Indonesia
(Damian and Hornick), but they have been exacerbated by the decentralization
efforts. In 2004, the new Act on Lawmaking once again defined legal hierarchy
(Art. 7 of Law no. 10 of 2004), but it has failed to clarify the relation between
regional regulations and national regulations below the level of government
regulation.
16. I have no exact data on this topic.
17. Its basis was Presidential Decree no. 52 of 1995.
18. Hantoro and Dewanto (2004).
19. See, e.g., Wijoyo 2004.
20. Suara Pembaruan (2003).
21. We should take into account, however, that Jakarta and Yogyakarta are special
cases, since here the province is the size of a district. Normally, the province has
little control over the districts’ monitoring functions, which means that districts
can simply disregard the wishes of the province (although the RAA no. 32 of 2004
has redressed this situation to some extent).
22. http://www.menlh.go.id/archive.php?action=infoandid=39andidx=amdalnet.
On 23 December 2008, there were altogether eighty-seven listed.
23. Rukmantara (2006).
24. Although Indonesia does have air pollution standards, for both stationary and
moving sources, these are hardly monitored. This is not surprising given the fact
that most air pollution is probably not of an industrial origin but from traffic and
forest fires (little is known about the contribution of industries to air pollution
(World Bank 2003)), while monitoring air pollution is renowned for being diffi-
cult and expensive.
25. Figures on actual monitoring and imposing sanctions are not available.
26. Interview with senior BPLHD West Java official Mr. Wisandana (July 1999).
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27. Unfortunately, they are not easy to access. After Bapedal reduced its involvement
in Prokasih in the early 2000s, there was no longer a clear obligation for the
provinces to send in their reports. Internal reorganizations have produced further
constraints. When I visited Bapedal (at that time already integrated into the
Department of the Environment) in 2003, it turned out rather difficult to acquire
an overview.
28. That industries fail to do this has been a regular complaint of environmental
officials and NGOs. For instance, the Jakarta Post of 23 April 2002 reports that
only 60 percent of the industries in Jakarta actually operate their water treatment
installations.
29. Prokasih reports of 1995 of these provinces (on file with author).
30. This is most clearly visible in the 1995 report (Prokasih Jawa Barat) on West Java
(on file with author). Until 1995 the results of this province had been quite
impressive, but with sharply dropping monitoring and sanctioning rates biologi-
cal oxygen demand levels in West Java rivers soared.
31. Interviews with West Java BPLHD staff Mr. Wisandana (May 2000), and Mr.
Wangsaatmadja (July 2001), Mr. Rudy (July 2001), and expert adviser to the
BPLHD West Java Ms. Gonnie Verbruggen (September 2008).
32. Interviews with staff of the Compliance and Enforcement Unit of Bapedal,
notably Mrs. Vivien (July 2003); interviews with staff of Bapedalda of Bandung
city, Mr. Nuriati and Mr. Supriatna (July 2001), and Bandung district, Mrs. Ita
(August 2001); and interviews with staff of the Indonesian Center of Environmen-
tal Law, Mrs. Awiati (July 2001), and Mr. Sugianto (July 2003). To become more
solid, this conclusion needs to be verified in other provinces and districts.
33. They may carry other names as well.
34. It is not that the Department of Industries did not perform its monitoring
functions, but, not the its focus was health and safety regulations, not the envi-
ronment (Kemp 2001). See also Braadbaart 1995.
35. Interview with West Java BPLHD official Mr. Wisandana (July 2001).
36. Interview with the heads of the Bapedalda of Bandung city and Bandung district
(July 1999 and July 2001).
37. Interview with West Java BPLHD official Mr. Wisandana (July 2001).
38. The phrase “compliance rates” refers to the numbers of firms whose effluent
outputs conform to the official standards, as recorded by these firms themselves
and controlled by the environmental authorities. It concerns 271 firms on Java,
129 on Sumatra, and 66 on other islands.
39. Interviews with Bapedalda staff of Bandung municipality and Bandung district
(August 2001) and interview with staff of the Compliance and Enforcement Unit
of Bapedal (July 2003).
40. On the other hand, the threat of potential enforcement actions seems to always
play a role in the behavior of plants confronted with complaints. Cf. Aalders
(2003), who explores this issue for success or failure of mediation.
41. Observed during several visits to the section, July 1999 and June 2000.
42. Still, the agency (which has been integrated now with the State Ministry of
the Environment) has continued to have its own special investigators. Accord-
ing to State Minister of the Environment Rachmat Witoelar, in 2005 there
were altogether 180 special investigators in Indonesia (Kompas, 29 November
2005).
43. Rulianto, Hidayat, and Riza (2002).
44. Of course, this differs strongly from one district to the other. For instance, in a
recent report by Human Rights Watch (2006) the major conclusion was that
forced evictions in Jakarta had become both more frequent and more brutal after
1998. Still, there is lots of evidence showing that district governments simply need
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to be more responsive to their constituencies, even if it is only because govern-
ment power is not taken for granted as before.
45. Interview with the Director of Legislation of the State Ministry of the Environ-
ment (December 2008).
46. Jakarta Post, 5 September 2003.
47. For instance in Cirebon, by a coalition of the YBHL (Legal Aid Foundation)
Cirebon, Bapedalda, and a branch from the social security agency PT Jamsostek
(Jakarta Post, 15 July 2003).
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